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CAROL LYNN EDEN, as Trustee of the 









RAYMOND F. SCHINAZI, individually, and ) 
RFS & ASSOCIATES, LLC, as the General ) 







Civil Action File No. 
2012CV224395 
Respondents. 
Order on Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike 
On May 13, 2015, the parties appeared before the Court to present oral 
argument on Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Respondents' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Upon consideration of the arguments of the parties, the 
briefs submitted on the motions, and the record in this case, the Court finds as follows: 
On August 23, 2005, Respondent Dr. Raymond F. Schinazi ("Schinazi") created 
The 2005 Schinazi GST Grantor Trust (the "Trust") and named Petitioner Carol Lynn 
Eden ("Eden") trustee. The qualified beneficiaries of the Trust are Schinazi's and 
Eden's daughter, Rebecca Elizabeth Schinazi Williams, and her descendants. In Item 
V(b) of the Trust instrument, Schinazi reserved for himself: 
the right, exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity without the approval 
or consent of any person in a fiduciary capacity, during my lifetime 
to reacquire any part or all of the property of any trust created 
hereunder by substituting property of equivalent value. 
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On August 25, 2005, an Amended and Restated Limited Partnership Agreement 
(the "LP Agreement") governing RFS Partners, L.P. ("RFS Partners") was executed by 
Schinazi as the manager of the general partner, RFS & Associates, LLC ("RFS & 
Associates"), and individually as the sale limited partner. As limited partner, Schinazi 
held a 99% interest in RFS Partners. 
On August 31, 2005, Schinazi transferred his limited partnership interest to the 
Trust in exchange for a $7 million promissory note. This transfer was accomplished in 
accordance with the LP Agreement by using a document identical to Exhibit A of the LP 
Agreement titled "Sale and Assignment of Interests in RFS Partners, L.P." (the "Sale 
and Assignment"). The Sale and Assignment states that the Trust is an assignee and 
"shall not be entitled to become or to exercise any rights of a Partner ... " It was 
executed by Schinazi as transferor limited partner, by Eden on behalf of the Trust as 
transferee, and by Schinazi as manager of the general partner. 
On September 26, 2005, Schinazi made a capital contribution of Pharmasset, 
Inc. ("Pharmasset") common stock to RFS Partners in exchange for a limited 
partnership interest and his admission as a limited partner. This transaction occurred 
through the execution of the Consent Agreement Regarding Contribution to Capital of 
RFS Partners, L.P. and Admission of Limited Partner (the "Consent Agreement") by 
Schinazi, as manager of the general partner, by Eden on behalf of the Trust as 
"LIMITED PARTNER," and by Schinazi in his personal capacity as the newly admitted 
limited partner. 
On January 2, 2012, Schinazi sent notice to Eden that he was exercising the 
asset substitution right reserved in Item V(b) of the Trust instrument and requested 
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Eden sign an acknowledgement of transfer and return it for his records. 
Simultaneously, he tendered an unsecured promissory note in the amount of 
$58,290,000.00 in a purported exchange of equivalent value for the Trust's interests in 
RFS Partners. Eden did not sign or return the acknowledgment and, on January 6, 
2012, she notified Schinazi that the promissory note could not be accepted because it 
was not a substitution of equivalent value. 
On January 12, 2012, Gilead Sciences bought Pharmasett at a price of $137.00 
per share, which equates to a total sale price of approximately $11 billion. At $137.00 
per share, the Trust contends RFS Partners' derivative interest in the Pharmasett 
common stock was valued at approximately $64,703,663. 
On January 19, 2012, Schinazi notified Eden that the promissory note was of 
equivalent value and that the value was calculated by an expert independent appraisal 
firm. Eden replied on January 25 that the promissory note could not be accepted 
because an unsecured note could not be of equivalent value and it would not be a 
prudent business decision to accept the substitution. No further communication about 
the purported transaction occurred until August 31,2012, when Eden provided Schinazi 
with a summary of the Trust's assets and transactions for the previous year, including 
the Trust's interest in RFS Partners. 
In a September 11,2012, response to Eden's summary of Trust assets, Schinazi 
stated that the Trust, as of January 2,2012, held stock in Morgan Stanley accounts, a 
promissory note from him for $58,290,000.00, and a promissory note payable to him for 
$7,000,000. 
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Respondents' Emergency Motion to Strike Affidavit of Lynn Eden and 
Unauthenticated Attachments 
Respondents argue that exhibits 1-15 in support of Eden's Motion were not 
authenticated and, therefore, are not admissible and cannot be considered at summary 
judgment. This Court finds Exhibits 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15 have been 
authenticated by Schinazi testifying under oath at the July 22, 2013, hearing on 
Petitioner's Motion for Injunction or by admission through Respondents' responsive 
pleadings. Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 have not been authenticated and have not been 
considered in ruling on Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Exhibits 6 and 14 have been authenticated by the Affidavit of Lynn Eden filed on 
April 1, 2015. Respondents argue that the Affidavit of Lynn Eden should not be 
considered because it was not filed contemporaneously with her motion in accordance 
with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(d). However, "the requirement that an affidavit supporting a 
motion be served contemporaneously with the motion 'is to ensure that the other side 
has adequate notice of and opportunity to respond to such evidence.'" Triple T-Bar, 
LLC v. DDR Southeast Springfield, LLC, 330 Ga. App. 847, 849 (2015) [quoting 
Alcatraz Media v. Yahoo! Inc., 290 Ga. App. 882, 884-85 (2008)]. "Trial courts may 
consider affidavits which are not filed or served within the time limits contemplated by 
the statutes ... " Id. [quoting Kropp v. Roberts, 246 Ga. App. 497, 498 (2000)]. 
The Affidavit of Lynn Eden was filed on April 1, 2015; the exhibits it authenticates 
were filed on January 8, 2015. The hearing on the cross-motions for summary 
judgment was held May 13, 2015. The affidavit was on file for more than 30 days prior 
to the hearing and there was ample time to respond to its contentions. Accordingly, the 
4 
Court can consider the Affidavit of Lynn Eden, Exhibits 6, and Exhibit 14 in support of 
Eden's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
However, material supporting a motion for summary judgment must be on file at 
least 30 days before the hearing to be considered in support of the movant. Porter 
Coatings v. Stein Steel and Supply Co., 247 Ga. 631, 631 (1981). The depositions and 
discovery material filed on May 4 and May 5, 2015, and the certified pleading filed on 
May 11, 2015, were not on file 30 days before the hearing and the Court has not 
considered any of these materials in support of Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
Finally, the Court has not considered the Guardian Ad Litem Report filed with 
Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
because the opinion of a guardian ad litem in another case has no effect on Eden's 
standing as trustee in this case. 
Summary Judgment 
Eden moves for summary judgment on Count II for Declaratory Judgment and 
Count V for Breach of Fiduciary Duties arising from the partnership. Respondents move 
for summary judgement on all remaining counts: Count II for Declaratory Judgment, 
Count IV for Damages for Failure to Tender Assets of Equivalent Value; Count V for 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty arising from the partnership, Count VI for Attorney's Fees and 
Expenses, and Count VII for Punitive Damages.' 
Summary judgment is appropriate when the court, viewing all the facts and 
reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
1 Count I for an Accounting and Count III for an Injunction were not included in Petitioner's Second Amended 
Complaint and are no longer being asserted. 
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party, concludes that the evidence does not create a triable issue as to the essential 
elements of the case. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c); Latson v. Boez, 278 Ga. 113, 113 
(2004); Holder Constr. Group v. Georgia Tech Facilities, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 796, 797 
(2006). With respect to a declaratory judgment action, the same standard controlling 
the consideration of a motion for summary judgment applies. Housing Auth. Of City of 
Macon v. Ellis, 288 Ga. App. 834, 834-35 (2007). 
I. Eden as trustee of the Trust is not barred from asserting this action 
Schinazi and RFS Associates assert that summary judgment should be granted 
in their favor on all counts because Eden is barred from asserting the Trust's claims for 
three reasons. First, Eden cannot assert the claims of the Trust in this suit because the 
beneficiaries of the Trust have released their claims in a settlement of other litigation. 
Second, because the beneficiaries of the Trust released their claims, Eden would not 
have standing to appeal and, therefore, should not have standing here. Third, allowing 
Eden to pursue these claims would result in an impermissible circuity of action. 
The Court finds, however, that Eden can assert the Trust's claims and a finding 
in the Trust's favor would not create an impermissible circuity of action. A "trust can act 
only through its trustees ... " Leone Hall Price Foundation v. Baker, 276 Ga. 318, 318 
(2003) (quoting Wammock v. Smith, 143 Ga. App. 186, 187(1) (1977)). See also 
Skinner v. DeKalb Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 246 Ga. 561, 563 (1980) ("legal title is in the 
trustee and the cause of action is his"). This is true even when the beneficiaries 
consent to the settlement of the action, because the trust is a separate legal entity from 
its beneficiaries and the trustee is duty-bound to represent the interests of the trust. 
See Leone Hall Price Foundation, 143 Ga. App. at 319-20. 
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Here, Respondents point to a settlement agreement executed by the parties in 
Raymond F. Schinazi, as Trustee of the Rebecca Elizabeth Schinazi 2006 Irrevocable 
Trust v. Rebecca Elizabeth Schinezi Williams, Superior Court of Fulton County, 
Georgia, Civil Action File No. 2012CV213123 (the "Williams Lawsuit"). That agreement 
states that the beneficiaries release Schinazi, with respect to this Trust and any other 
trusts, "for any and all claims ... that were asserted or are capable of being asserted," by 
the beneficiaries. 
However, neither the Trust at issue in this case nor the Trustee, Eden, was a 
party to the Williams Lawsuit or the corresponding settlement agreement. Because the 
Trust is a separate legal entity from its beneficiaries, the beneficiaries could not and 
have not released the claims asserted by the Trustee in this action. Divesting Eden's 
ability to assert a legal claim on behalf of the Trust without her consent would prevent 
her from conforming to her duty to protect the interests of the Trust. 
Next, Respondents argue that Eden would not have standing to appeal a 
decision in this case and, therefore should not have standing here. However, whether 
Eden would have standing to appeal is not determinative of her standing to pursue the 
Trust's claims in this Court. See e.g. First Nat. Bank of Rome v. Yancey, 207 Ga. 437, 
437 (1950) (Executors and trustees had standing in the trial court but lacked standing to 
bring appeal because they were not "aggrieved"). If there is an appeal of this Court's 
decision in this case, the appellate court, not this Court, will determine if there is an 
appealable issue. See id. 
Lastly, Respondents argue that allowing Eden to assert this action would result in 
an impermissible circuity of action, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 328. Under 
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§ 328, U[i]f a claim against a third person is held in trust, a discharge of the claim given 
by the beneficiary terminates the liability of the third person if, but only if, to hold the 
third person liable would result in circuity of action." The Comment to § 328 clarifies 
that this does not create a legal defense. Instead, it notes that an obligor would have an 
equitable defense to claims by the trust if it made payment directly to the beneficiary 
because the trustee would be required to pay the beneficiary who, having already been 
paid, would be obligated to repay the obligor. See § 328, comment b. The result would 
be the same "where the beneficiary gives the obligor a release of the claim against him." 
Id. Section 328 has never been applied in Georgia and is not included in Restatement 
3d and the Court declines to apply it here. 
However, even under Section 328, there would not be a circuity of action if Eden 
recovered on behalf of the Trust because Eden as trustee would not be required to 
distribute the entire interest to the beneficiaries upon recovery. Instead, Eden may 
distribute such amounts she deems appropriate to the beneficiaries to support their 
accustomed manner of living, use income or principal for charitable purposes, and 
reimburse herself for administrative expenses. Compare Ricke v. Armco Inc., 92 F.3d 
720, 725 (8th Cir. 1996) (Because the terms of the trust showed the trustee would not 
be required to immediately pay all recovered funds to the beneficiaries there would be 
no impermissible circuity of action under Section 328); with Larry v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. 
Co., 74 F.Supp. 798, 799 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (Widow, who was both heir to her husband's 
estate and administratix of his will, settled all claims with her husband's employer 
related to his death in her role as heir for $15,000 and then proceeded to sue the 
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employer in her role as adminstratix for wrongful death, creating an impermissible 
circuity of action). 
For all the above stated reasons, this Court finds that Eden, as trustee, can 
pursue the claims on behalf the Trust. 
II. A Declaratory Judgment Action is Proper 
Petitioner and Respondents each contend they are entitled to summary judgment 
in the declaratory judgment action where the prevailing issue is whether the transfer of 
the Trust's interest in RFS Partners to Schinazi was valid. "In cases of actual 
controversy, the respective superior courts of this state shall have power, upon petition 
or other appropriate pleading, to declare rights and other legal relations of any 
interested party petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could 
be prayed; and the declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or 
decree and be reviewable as such." O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2. "A declaratory judgment is 
authorized when there are 'circumstances showing [a] necessity for a determination of 
the dispute to guide and protect the plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity with regard 
to the propriety of some future act or conduct, which is properly incident to his alleged 
rights and which if taken without direction might reasonably jeopardize his interest.. .. '" 
Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210, 214 (1999) [citing Morgan v. Guaranty Nat. Cos., 
268 Ga. 343, 344 (1997)]. 
Eden, as trustee, is uncertain regarding the current ownership of the limited 
partnership interest the Trust held in RFS Partners. Eden seeks a determination of 
whether the purported transfer of the Trust's interest by Schinazi on January 2,2012, 
was effective. The determination will settle a dispute over the ownership of the interest 
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and will guide the parties as to future actions regarding taxes, distributions, and the 
parties' rights under the LP Agreement. Accordingly, Eden properly seeks a declaratory 
judgment. 
III. Count II - Declaratory Judgment - Ownership of the Limited Partnership 
Interest in RFS Partners 
To determine the ownership of RFS Partners, this Court must determine both the 
Trust's ownership status as of January 2,2012, when Schinazi asserted his right to 
reacquire Trust property under Item V(b) of the Trust instrument, and how the LP 
Agreement and the Trust instrument interact. This inquiry begins with the LP 
Agreement, which is a matter of contract construction. 
a. Transferring Partnership Interest under the LP Agreement and the 
Trust's Ownership Status on August 31, 2005 
'The construction of a contract is a question of law for the court unless, after the 
application of the rules of construction, the contract remains ambiguous." Harris v. 
Distinctive Builders, Inc., 249 Ga. App. 686, 687 (2001). 
"Contract construction involves three steps: (1) Is the language 
clear and unambiguous? If it is, the court simply enforces the 
contract according to its terms. If it is ambiguous, (2) the court must 
apply the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity. If 
the ambiguity cannot be resolved, (3) the issue of what the 
ambiguous language means and what the parties intended must be 
resolved by a jury." 
Id. at 688. After construction of the LP Agreement, this Court finds there is no 
ambiguous language or dispute over the parties' intent that must be decided by a jury. 
Therefore, the Court must enforce it as written, unless contrary rights under the Trust 
instrument trump the rights acquired under the LP Agreement. 
The LP Agreement provides two ways a limited partner's interest can be 
transferred. The first way is through Section 5.2 (a) and 5.4, which read as follows: 
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(a) Transfers by Limited Partners. No Limited Partner shall sell, 
assign, transfer ... or otherwise dispose of all or any part of such 
Limited Partner's interest to any Person without the prior or 
simultaneous written consent of the General Partner to any such 
proposed disposition. A transferee of all or part of a Limited 
Partner's interest may be admitted as a Partner only upon approval 
of the General Partner which may be granted or withheld in the sole 
and absolute discretion of the General Partner, and unless so 
admitted shall, any other provision hereof notwithstanding, have 
only the share of Partnership capital, Net Profit, Net Loss, 
allocations and distributions attributable to the Interest or portion 
thereof that is the subject of the transfer. 
5.4. Form of Transfers. A Limited Partner may transfer all or any 
part of such Limited Partner's economic interest in the Partnership, 
subject to compliance with the other provisions of this Section 5, if 
the transferor and transferee Partners and, if applicable, the 
General Partner, execute an Assignment substantially in the form of 
Exhibit A or A-1, as applicable, attached hereto and incorporated 
herein by this reference. The General Partner's execution of such 
Assignment shall signify, if applicable, the consent of the General 
Partner to such transfer. 
Section 5.2 (a) allows limited partners to transfer their interest if they receive the 
general partner's prior or simultaneous consent. The form of the transfer is governed by 
Section 5.4, which requires the execution of an assignment substantially in the form of 
Exhibit A or A-1 by the transferor, transferee, and, if applicable, the general partner. 
Execution by the general partner is applicable when transferring under Section 5.2, 
because prior or simultaneous general partner consent is required to transfer the 
interest. Thus, when transferring interest under Section 5.2 (a), execution of the 
assignment demonstrates the general partner's consent to the transfer, because, 
without it, the transfer cannot occur. 
In addition, a Limited Partner's interest can be transferred under Section 5.3 
which reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
5.3. Excepted Transfers. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Agreement to the contrary, if 
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(a) any economic interest of a Partner in the Partnership is 
transferred by gift, sale, as a result of death or legal 
incompetency of a Partner, or upon distribution to a 
beneficiary of a Trust, whether, such distribution is by 
operation of law or otherwise; and 
(b) the transferee is a Family Member ... 
the transfer shall be valid, but the transferee shall have only the 
status of an assignee and shall not be entitled to become or 
exercise any rights of a Partner. The transferee may become a 
substituted Limited Partner only upon the written approval of the 
General Partner. 
Section 5.3 validates a transfer to a Family Member that was completed without 
the prior or simultaneous consent of the general partner required by Section 5.2. 
Further, Section 5.3 validates a transfer to a Family Member that is completed without 
using an assignment form substantially similar to Exhibit A or A-1 as required by Section 
5.4. Both the Trust and Schinazi meet the definition of Family Member. 
Although Sections 5.2 and 5.3 differ on how a transfer of limited partnership 
interest can occur, the sections agree that transfer of the interest does not automatically 
give the transferee the status of limited partner. Both sections state that the transferee 
is an assignee unless and until the general partner approves the admission of the 
transferee as a limited partner. This provision indicates that approval is a separate step 
from the transfer. Therefore, execution of the assignment by the general partner when 
transferring an interest under Section 5.2 indicates the general partner's consent to 
assignment of interests, but not approval of admission into the partnership. A decision 
to the contrary would render meaningless the intended difference between transferring 
an economic interest and approving a transferee for admission as a limited partner. 
See Forsyth County v. Waterscape Services, LLC, 303 Ga. App. 623, 631 (2010)( "It is 
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the cardinal rule of contract construction that a court should, if possible, construe a 
contract so as not to render any of its provisions meaningless and in a manner that 
gives effect to all of its contractual terms."). 
Here, the original transfer from Shinazi, as transferor limited partner, to the Trust, 
on August 31, 2005, was effective under Section 5.2 (a) because Shinazi signed the 
Sale and Assignment on behalf of the general partner RFS & Associates and as 
transferor limited partner. Therefore, although the Trust fits into the definition of Family 
Member, the initial transfer was effective under Section 5.2, not 5.3, because the 
general partner's consent was given prior to or simultaneously with transfer. 
Although Eden contends that the general partner's execution of the Sale and 
Assignment signified the approval of the Trust's admission as a limited partner, a plain 
reading of the LP Agreement contradicts this contention. The terms of the LP 
Agreement dictate that approval of the transferee as a limited partner is a step that is 
separate from consent to the transfer. The general partner's approval of the admission 
of the Trust as a limited partner was not given in the transfer on August 31, 2005. Thus, 
the Trust was an assignee when the interest in RFS Partners was originally transferred. 
However, this finding is not determinative of the Trust's ownership status as of January 
2,2012. 
b. Whether the Trust remained an Assignee of the Partnership on 
January 2, 2012 
As a separate step from transfer, admission as a limited partner can be 
accomplished subsequent to the transfer. "An assignee of a partnership interest. .. may 
become a limited partner if and to the extent that. .. [t]he partnership agreement so 
provides ... " O.C.G.A. § 14-9-704. Section 5.1 if the LP Agreement states, "no Person 
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shall be admitted to the Partnership as either a general or limited partner without the 
consent of the General Partner." Section 5.2 of the LP Agreement requires approval by 
the general partner of the admission of a transferee as a limited partner. Section 5.3 
calls for written approval by the general partner. No section proscribes the required 
information that must be included to show general partner approval of a limited partner's 
admission; the LP Agreement simply calls for approval or consent of the general 
partner. 
In interpreting contracts, "[w]ords generally bear their usual and common 
significance ... " O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 (2). Black's Law Dictionary defines "approve" as, "[t]o 
give formal sanction to; to confirm authoritatively." APPROVE, Black's Law Dictionary 
(10th ed. 2014). Further, Black's Law Dictionary defines "consent" as, " ... agreement, 
approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose, esp. given voluntarily by a 
competent person; legally effective assent." CONSENT, Black's Law Dictionary (10th 
ed.2014). 
Eden argues that the September 26, 2005 Consent Agreement shows the 
general partner's consent to the Trust's admission as a limited partner and this Court 
agrees. Although the stated purpose of the Consent Agreement is to consent to the 
admission of Schinazi as a limited partner in exchange for his capital contribution, it also 
shows the general partner's approval and consent to the admission of the Trust as a 
limited partner. The Consent Agreement calls the Trust the "sole limited partner" of 
RFS Partners and the signature block identifies the Trust as "LIMITED PARTNER." 
Further, the Trust is included with RFS & Associates in the defined term "Partners." 
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Identifying the Trust in this manner formally acknowledges and confirms the Trust's 
status as a limited partner. 
The Consent Agreement was executed by Schinazi as the manager of the 
general partner, by Eden on behalf of the Trust as the "Limited Partner," and by 
Schinazi, individually, as the newly admitted limited partner. Thus, the Consent 
Agreement demonstrates the general partner's written approval of the Trust as 
substituted limited partner, no later than September 26, 2005. See O.C.G.A. § 14-9- 
301 (b)(2); See Brady v. J.E. Phillips Mule Co., 27 Ga. App. 444,444 (1921) 
("Partnership or no partnership is a fact which may be established by statements or 
admissions of the undisputed partner ... "). 
Further, Section 7 of the LP Agreement, governing amendments, also confirms 
the Trust's status as a limited partner. Section 7 states: 
No change or modification of this Agreement shall be valid or 
binding upon a Partner, nor shall any term or condition of this 
Agreement be considered waived by a Partner, unless the change, 
modification or waiver is in writing and is signed by such Partner. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an amendment to this Agreement 
shall be valid and binding on all Partners if its purpose is to reflect 
the admission of a new Partner or the transfer of an interest in the 
Partnership (in either case in compliance with the other such 
provisions of this Agreement), and it is signed by the Partners 
having the power to approve such admission or transfer, and, as 
the case may be, the newly admitted Partner or the transferor and 
transferee Partner. 
Partner is defined by the LP Agreement as any Person that is or becomes a party 
to the LP Agreement. Here, the Consent Agreement confirms the Trust's status as a 
limited partner because it is a valid amendment signed by all Partners showing the Trust 
is a party to the LP Agreement necessary to effectuate the transfer to Schinazi. In fact, 
if the Trust was not a Partner, there was no need for the Trust to execute the Consent 
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Agreement. See O.C.G.A. § 14-9-702 (providing that "[u]ntil the assignee of a 
partnership interest becomes a partner, the assignor partner continues to be a partner 
and to have the power to exercise any rights or powers of a partner"). 
Having found that the Trust was a limited partner and had the corresponding 
rights under the LP Agreement on January 2,2012, the Court must now decide if 
Schinazi's unilateral transfer of the Trust's limited partnership interest under Item V(b) of 
the Trust instrument was valid. 
c. Whether the January 2, 2012, Transfer Was Effective Under the LP 
Agreement or was Ratified by the Trustee 
Respondents argue that the even if the Trust was a limited partner, the transfer 
of the Trust's limited partnership interest is valid under Section 5.3 of the LP Agreement 
because Schinazi is a Family Member and the general partner approved the transfer. 
While the general partner must approve a transfer of partnership, there is no authority 
under the LP Agreement for a general partner to unilaterally force a sale of a limited 
partner's interest to another. Here, the Trust did not approve transferring its limited 
partnership interest. Thus, the alleged transfer would not be valid as it did not comply 
with LP Agreement. 
Respondents argue that Eden ratified the transfer by retaining a benefit of the 
transaction and, in such, should be estopped from denying its occurrence. They state 
that because the $58 million note allows for the Trust to set-off interest payments on the 
$7 million note, and, the Trust has done so by not making any payments on the $7 
million note, the Trust retained a pecuniary benefit. However, the Court finds that Eden 
did not ratify the transaction. 
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"Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind him 
but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or 
all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him." Greene v. Golucke, 202 
Ga. 494, 494 (1947). "The doctrine of ratification is not applicable against a person as 
to an act of one who did not assume to act in his name or under authority from him." Id. 
"Generally, the question of ratification is one which depends upon the intention of the 
parties ... " Nalley v. Langdale, 319 Ga. App. 354, 366 (2012). 
Here, Respondents have repeatedly asserted that Schinazi did not need any 
consent, approval, or any action whatever by Eden to effectuate the transfer. It is not 
disputed, therefore, that Schinazi was not acting on behalf of Eden or under the 
trustee's authority. Further, even if Schinazi was acting on Eden's behalf, Eden 
repudiated the transfer by rejecting it in her January 6 letter. See e.g. Griggs v. 
Dodson, 223 Ga. 164, 169 (1967) ("Where a principal is informed by his agent of what 
he has done, unless the principal repudiates the act promptly or within a reasonable 
time, ratification will be inferred."). Finally, Eden's intent to reject the transfer is clearly 
manifested through her January 19 and August 31 letters. For all these reasons, the 
Court finds that Eden did not ratify the transfer. 
d. Whether the Reacquisition Right under the Trust instrument trumps 
the rights held under the LP Agreement 
Respondents argue that Schinazi's reacquisition right under the Trust trumps any 
rights held under the LP Agreement and, therefore, no matter what the status of the 
Trust is in the partnership, the transfer of its interest is valid. The Court disagrees. 
Schinazi, as grantor of the Trust, manager of the general partner of RFS Partners, and 
the original sole limited partner of RFS Partners, created the parties' rights under each 
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document and had full control over the Trust's status under the LP Agreement. Thus, 
Schinazi must comply with the self-imposed restrictions of the LP Agreement. 
The cardinal rule in trust law is that the intention of the settlor is to be followed. 
Rollins v. Rollins, 294 Ga. 711, 714 (2014). This intention is determined by first looking 
to the trust documents. Rose v. Waldrip, 316 Ga. App. 812, 815 (2012). 
In Item V(b) of the Trust, Schinazi reserves for himself the right, in a non-fiduciary 
capacity and without regard to the trustee, to reacquire property held in trust by 
substituting property of equivalent value. This reservation of right makes the Trust a 
grantor trust, which, for federal income tax purposes, deems Schinazi the "owner" of the 
Trust property and makes him, and not the Trust, liable for federal income taxes." See 
26 U.S.C. 671 et seq. Having the ability to substitute property of equivalent value for 
property held in trust was Schinazi's clear intent. 
However, Schinazi's intent is also captured in the terms of the LP Agreement, 
because he was the sale representative of, and executed the LP Agreement on behalf 
of, both original parties to the LP Agreement. See Garrett v. Southern Health Corp. of 
Ellijay, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 176, 182 (2013) ("If the terms of a contract are plain and 
unambiguous, the contractual terms alone determine the parties' intent."). Thus, the 
Court must consider both Schinazi's intent as grantor and his intent as to the LP 
2 Respondents contend Eden has no cause of action based on the Trust Item V(b}, not even the ability to 
challenge the equivalency of the value of the substituted property. However, this could not have been 
Schinazi's intent if he intended to receive grantor trust tax treatment because the Internal Revenue 
Service requires that the trustee, or the grantor, have a fiduciary obligation under local law or the terms 
of the trust instrument to ensure the assets exchanged are for equivalent value to allow the value of the 
trust property to be excluded from the settlor's gross estate. See Rev. Rul. 2008-22; See Estate of Jordahl 
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 92 (1975) (Where the decedent reserved the right to substitute property of 
equivalent value and was bound by a fiduciary duty, the decedent could not use the substitution power 
to deplete the trust or shift trust benefits among beneficiaries, and in such, the substitution right was 
not a power that altered, amended, or revoked the trust, which would make it property included in the 
gross estate). 
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Agreement. See e.g. Rollins v. Rollins, 294 Ga. 711,714-15 (2014) (The Supreme 
Court determined the overall intent of the settlor as to the applicable fiduciary duties by 
considering both the roles assigned by the trust instruments and the roles assigned 
under the business entities the settlor created to hold assets within those trusts). 
The LP Agreement sets forth how the Trust can hold a partnership interest as an 
assignee. It also provides the general partner the ability to make an assignee a limited 
partner. This shows Schinazi intended to have the ability to give the Trust rights that 
would conflict with his unilateral reacquisition right under the Trust instrument. It took 
his action to change the status of the Trust from assignee to limited partner, and as 
grantor of the Trust and manager of the general partner, he is presumed to understand 
the roles he assigned to himself and intend the results of his own actions. See e.g. 
Rollins v. Rollins, 294 Ga. 711, 714-15 (2014) (The settlor, as a man of considerable 
business experience, "could not but have appreciated the delicate role which he 
assigned to the trustees," when he assigned corporate and trust fiduciary roles to the 
same individuals). 
The intent of the settlor governs the meaning of the trust, but here, the settlor 
was also the creator of a partnership agreement which contemplated his ability to give 
rights contrary to his reserved Trust rights. Schinazi cannot validate actions as proper 
under the Trust instrument when he also controlled the contrary partnership rights. 
Therefore, the right to reacquire property under the Trust instrument does not 
trump the rights of a limited partner acquired by the Trust under the LP Agreement. The 
Court finds, therefore, that the attempted transfer in contravention of the LP Agreement 
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is void under Section 5.2 (c) of the LP Aqreement." Accordingly, as it relates to Count" 
for Declaratory Judgment, Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and 
Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED as follows, 
It is hereby ORDERED that: 
(a) The Trust remains the owner of the limited partnership interest it held at the 
time of the attempted transfer in contravention of the LP Agreement. 
(b) The Respondents lack and lacked the authority to unilaterally transfer to 
Respondent Schinazi the Trust's limited partnership interest. 
(c) The Trust is not required to transfer its limited partnership interest to Schinazi. 
IV. Count IV - Damages Against Respondent Schinazi for Failure to Tender 
Assets of Equivalent Value 
In Eden's Second Amended Complaint she asserts a claim for damages arguing 
that the Trust was harmed because the $58,290,000 unsecured promissory note 
tendered in the purported substitution of equivalent value was not of equivalent value. 
In light of the Court's findings that the transfer was void and that the Trust still owns its 
limited partnership interest in RFS Partners, a tender of a note that did not effectuate 
any change in the Trust's ownership status did not harm the Trust. Thus, Count IV is 
moot. 
Additionally, Count IV improperly seeks damages in a declaratory judgment 
action. See infra Section V. Accordingly, as it relates to Count IV, Respondents' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
3 Section 5.2 (c) states: II Any attempted transfer of an interest in contravention of this Section 5.2 shall be void and 
shall not bind or be recognized by the Partnership. Transfers restricted by this Section 5 shall include both 
voluntary and involuntary transfers and transfers by operation of law, except as otherwise expressly provided 
herein." 
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V. Count V - Breach of Duties under the Partnership Agreement by 
Respondents RFS & Associates and Schinazi 
Petitioner and Respondents each move for summary judgment on Petitioner's 
breach of fiduciary duties claim. Eden argues that Respondents breached the fiduciary 
duties they owed under the partnership by effectuating and recognizing the transfer of 
the Trust's partnership interest. However, there is no evidence that the breach of 
fiduciary duties claim could be asserted independent of the declaratory judgment action 
and, therefore, it cannot survive. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act was "designed ... to guide parties ... as to their 
future conduct with a view to avoid litigation, rather than in aid of it, and to settle and fix 
rights at a time before there had been breaches of contracts, violations and disregard of 
rights of others ... " Shippem v. Folsom, 200 Ga. 58, 67 (1945). As such, an action for 
declaratory judgment does not lie when the rights of the parties have already accrued. 
See Pinnacle Benning LLC v. Clark Realty Capital, LLC, 314 Ga. App. 609, 612 (2012). 
Accordingly, a tort action must be capable of being asserted independent of the 
declaratory judgment action to be maintained in the same petition. See e.g. Cleland v. 
Gwinnett County, 226 Ga. App. 636, 638 (1997) (Damages for allowing a variance and 
the resulting construction could be sought in addition to a declaratory judgment on the 
meaning of the zoning ordinance); see e.g. Southern Heritage Ins. v. Green Ins. 
Agency, 249 Ga. App. 749, 750 (2001) (Insurance company could not assert an action 
for indemnification that was dependent on an adverse declaratory judgment). 
Because Eden properly asserts a claim for declaratory judgment, the evidence 
must support her ability to independently assert the tort claims. The only fiduciary duty 
asserted arises from the Trust's limited partnership status. Whether the Trust was an 
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assignee or a limited partner was an actual controversy to be resolved in the declaratory 
judgment action. Therefore, the breach of fiduciary duties claim cannot be asserted 
independent of the declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, as to Count V for Breach 
of Fiduciary Duties arising from the partnership, Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment is hereby DENIED and Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby GRANTED. 
VI. Count VI- Attorneys' Fees Under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 
Respondents move for summary judgment on Eden's claim for attorneys' fees 
under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 arguing that Eden cannot demonstrate bad faith where she 
has asserted a claim seeking declaratory judgment. Because there are no surviving 
claims independent of the declaratory judgment action and there was uncertainty as to 
the rights of the parties, this Court agrees. 
Attorneys' fees may be awarded,. "where the defendant has acted in bad faith, 
has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and 
expense ... " O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. However, uncertainty is required for the existence of 
a declaratory judgment action and when that uncertainty creates a bona fide 
controversy attorneys' fees are not recoverable. See General Hasp. of Humana, Inc. v. 
Jenkins, 188 Ga. App. 825, 828-29 (1988). 
Here, a bona fide controversy over the Trust's status under the LP Agreement 
and as to its ownership of the limited partnership interest existed. Respondents acted in 
accordance with their interpretation of the disputed rights. In such, the uncertainty that 
allowed Eden to bring a declaratory judgment action precludes her from asserting a 
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claim for attorneys' fees. Accordingly, as to Count VI, Respondents Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. 
VII. Count VII - Punitive Damages 
For the same reasons that Eden is precluded from asserting a claim for 
attorneys' fees, she is precluded from seeking punitive damages. No tort claim survives 
this decision and, therefore, punitive damages are not recoverable. See e.g. O.C.G.A. 
§ 51-12-5.1. Additionally, Respondents' actions were in accordance with their 
interpretation of the disputed rights and cannot be considered, "willful misconduct, 
malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the 
presumption of conscious indifference to consequences." Id. The uncertainty that 
allows the declaratory judgment action to be asserted precludes punitive damages in 
this case. Accordingly, as to Count VII, Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment is 
hereby GRANTED. 
SO ORDERED this 1-day of July, 2015. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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